Stack status

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Verified 2026-10-12 against live sources (demo sprint D0). Every claim links its source. Unverified means we looked and could not confirm it from a primary source; do not build on it without checking again.

1. Stack

Network

	Mainnet	Testnet	Source
Protocol	29	29	Horizon root current_protocol_version; RPC getVersionInfo / getNetwork
stellar-core	29.0.0	29.0.0	Horizon root core_version
Horizon	29.0.0	29.0.0	https://horizon.stellar.org, https://horizon-testnet.stellar.org
Stellar RPC	29.0.0 (build 2026-09-22)	29.0.0	RPC getVersionInfo
Latest ledger at check	64905297	5157737	Horizon root

Toolchain

Package	Version	Released	Notes
soroban-sdk (Rust)	29.0.0 → 29.0.1 (2026-10-14)	2026-10-07 / 2026-10-12	MSRV 1.91; repo pins Rust 1.94.0 (crates.io). 29.0.0’s env crates were yanked; see audit/remediation-log.md.
stellar-cli	28.1.0	2026-09-26	MSRV 1.93 (crates.io)
@stellar/stellar-sdk (JS)	17.2.1	2026-10-01	(npm)

Free endpoints

Listed publicly by Stellar’s RPC providers page (“can be used for development, testing, and production”); no rate limits are published there. Endpoints marked ✓ answered getVersionInfo on 2026-10-12.

Provider	Mainnet RPC	Testnet RPC
SDF	— (no public mainnet RPC listed)	https://soroban-testnet.stellar.org ✓
sorobanrpc.com	https://mainnet.sorobanrpc.com ✓	—
Gateway	https://soroban-rpc.mainnet.stellar.gateway.fm ✓	https://soroban-rpc.testnet.stellar.gateway.fm
Nodies	https://stellar-soroban-public.nodies.app	https://stellar-soroban-testnet-public.nodies.app
OnFinality	https://stellar.api.onfinality.io/public	—
Lightsail	https://rpc.lightsail.network/ (archive: archive-rpc.lightsail.network)	—
Ankr	https://rpc.ankr.com/stellar_soroban (archive)	—

Horizon: SDF’s horizon.stellar.org and horizon-testnet.stellar.org both answered. Testnet friendbot: https://friendbot.stellar.org/ (from RPC getNetwork).

2. Supply

Can a Soroban contract read a classic asset’s total supply through the Stellar Asset Contract? No.

• The SAC implements the SEP-41 token interface (allowance, approve, balance, transfer, transfer_from, burn, burn_from, decimals, name, symbol) plus admin functions (set_admin, admin, set_authorized, authorized, mint, clawback, trust). None returns a total supply. (Stellar Asset Contract docs)
• Classic balances live in trustlines (64-bit), contract balances in contract data entries (128-bit) — same source. Inference, not verified from protocol spec: the ledger has no entry that stores a per-asset total; Horizon computes totals during ingestion.

→ Supply has to be brought on-chain by a supply witness (see D0-RECOMMENDATION.md).

Off-chain formula

From the Horizon asset record (/assets?asset_code=…&asset_issuer=…), all amounts as 7-decimal strings:

supply = balances.authorized
       + balances.authorized_to_maintain_liabilities
       + balances.unauthorized
       + claimable_balances_amount
       + liquidity_pools_amount
       + contracts_amount

• Amounts locked in DEX offers are still inside trustline balances, so they are counted once.
• The issuer account holds no balance of its own asset, so nothing to subtract.
• Ledger pinning: /assets has no ledger parameter. Record Horizon’s history_latest_ledger immediately before and after the read; if they differ, re-read. For exact historical supply, use Hubble or Galexie.

Cross-check (USDC, GA5Z…KZVN): formula = 376,112,799.58; stellar.expert supply = 376,311,244.84 (difference 198,445.26, 0.053%).

Reconciliation (D1, 2026-10-12, reads in parallel, Horizon ledgers 64905729–64905730):

Asset	Contracts holding	Formula	stellar.expert	Difference
USDC	53,028	376,193,906.94	376,392,843.81	+198,936.87 (+0.053%)
CETES	36	58,377,175.11	58,416,541.38	+39,366.27 (+0.067%)
USTRY	39	11,513,904.72	11,470,087.13	−43,817.59 (−0.381%)
AQUA	267	99,927,569,420.97	99,928,735,460.13	+1,166,039.16 (+0.001%)
EURC (Circle)	93	4,515,319.38	4,515,595.81	+276.43 (+0.006%)
USDGLO	10	253,603.22	253,603.22	+0.0009
MGUSD	4 (1.50 held)	25,245,869.52	25,245,869.52	0

Findings:

• The gap is not timing: USDC’s gap was the same to within 0.3% of itself across reads hours apart.
• Assets with negligible Soroban contract holdings match exactly (MGUSD, USDGLO). Gaps appear with contract activity.
• Gaps go both ways (USTRY is lower at stellar.expert), so “archived contract balances missing from Horizon” cannot be the only cause.
• Conclusion: the two sources count contract-held balances differently. Neither is shown to be right. Trustline, claimable-balance and pool amounts agree.

Decision stands: supply is not published. Resolving it needs a third, independent count of SAC contract balances at a pinned ledger — Hubble (BigQuery, contract_data at a ledger) or enumerating SAC balance entries via RPC getLedgerEntries. Option for D2 (needs a decision): publish supply only for assets whose contracts_amount is below 0.01% of the total, where both sources agree.

3. SEP-1 fields for anchored assets

SEP-1 v2.7.0 (updated 2025-01-16). [[CURRENCIES]] fields relevant to Assay, verbatim descriptions abbreviated. All are optional except code (and issuer for classic assets / contract for Soroban tokens).

Field	Type	Meaning
code	string ≤12	Token code. Required.
issuer	G…	Issuing account. Required for classic assets.
contract	C…	SEP-41 token contract. Required for non-classic tokens.
status	string	live, dead, test or private.
is_asset_anchored	boolean	true if the token can be redeemed for an underlying asset.
anchor_asset_type	string	fiat, crypto, nft, stock, bond, commodity, realestate, other.
anchor_asset	string	What it is anchored to, e.g. USD.
attestation_of_reserve	url	“URL to attestation or other proof, evidence, or verification of reserves, such as third-party audits.”
redemption_instructions	string	How to redeem.
collateral_addresses	list	For anchored crypto tokens: addresses holding the backing.
collateral_address_messages	list	Messages stating those funds back the asset.
collateral_address_signatures	list	Signatures of those messages by each address’s key.
regulated / approval_server	bool / url	SEP-8 regulated assets.

Locating the file: the issuer account’s home_domain → https://{home_domain}/.well-known/stellar.toml. Servers must send Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *. A currency entry may instead be toml = "https://DOMAIN/.well-known/CURRENCY.toml", a separate file holding that currency’s fields.

Correction to earlier project notes: attestation_of_reserve is optional, not required.

4. Census

See CENSUS-v0.md.

5. Oracles on Stellar

Provider	On Stellar today	Proof of reserve on Stellar	Source
RedStone	Live since March 2026 (Soroban, Rust; audited by Zellic and Veridise per coverage). SEP-40 feeds; 9 assets live as of 2026-06-04: XLM, USDC, EURC, PYUSD, CETES, USTRY, TESOURO, SolvBTC, xSolvBTC (USST in progress).	None found. RedStone’s 2026-08-26 Stellar report lists price feeds only; NAV figures there come from issuers.	RedStone blog 2026-06-04, RedStone report 2026-08-26
Chainlink	Stellar joined Chainlink Scale and announced Data Feeds, Data Streams and CCIP (Stellar blog). Unverified: whether Data Feeds are live on Stellar mainnet — a search summary cited a Chainlink changelog entry dated 2026-09-29, but we could not open it and Chainlink’s addresses page did not show Stellar. Stellar’s oracle page does not list Chainlink.	None found. Chainlink PoR exists on other chains; nothing for Stellar.	Stellar oracle providers
Reflector	SEP-40 price feeds (Stellar DEX, external CEX/DEX, FX), mainnet and testnet; threshold webhook subscriptions.	No	Same
Band	Mainnet CCQX…GG5M, testnet CBRV…JJMF.	No	Same
DIA	Testnet only (USDC, BTC, DIA).	No	Same
Pyth	Pull model, subscription; mainnet verifier CACZ…3HCH.	No	Same

Public proof-of-reserve roadmap for Stellar: none found.

6. “Reserve-verified” stablecoins

Cointelegraph reported “roughly $438 million in reserve-verified stablecoins currently issued on Stellar” and RWA market cap of $3.996B as of 2026-08-29, citing “a Dune Analytics dashboard maintained by Stellar” (via TradingView). Not found: the dashboard URL, who maintains the “reserve-verified” list, and the criteria.

Question for the Stellar Dev Discord:

Stellar’s Dune dashboard reports about $438M in “reserve-verified” stablecoins. Could someone point us to the dashboard, and tell us who maintains the reserve-verified list and what qualifies an asset (for example: an attestation_of_reserve link in stellar.toml, a named auditor, a report under a certain age)? We’re building an open proof-of-reserves board for Stellar and want to use the same definition or explain clearly where ours differs.

7. Lending markets and how they stop new exposure

Protocol	RWA collateral	How it pauses	Verified from
Blend v2	Yes; RWA pools held “just above $2M in TVL” (RedStone, 2026-08-26) out of Stellar DeFi TVL of $259.13M.	Pool-wide, immediate: set_status(pool_status) — admin-only (admin.require_auth()). Status 2 = admin on-ice (no new borrowing), 4 = admin frozen (no supply or borrowing); 3 = on-ice lifts admin states. Per reserve, delayed: ReserveConfig.enabled = false blocks Supply, SupplyCollateral and Borrow for that reserve (ReserveDisabled), but changes go through queue_set_reserve, which has a one-week timelock unless the pool is in setup (status 6). Withdrawals, repayments and liquidations stay open.	Source: blend-contracts-v2 @ ba22b48 pool/src/contract.rs (set_status), pool/src/pool/reserve.rs:148, pool/src/pool/config.rs:78-82
Blend + pool-status-admin (Zenith)	—	A contract that becomes a Blend pool’s admin and keeps only set_status; cannot change reserves, rates or admin; not upgradeable; built on OpenZeppelin Stellar Contracts v0.7.0 (Ownable). MIT. No audit mentioned.	README (code not reviewed)
Templar	Yes: CETES, USTRY, deJAAA, deJTRSY and others per announcements. Uses NEAR MPC / Chain Signatures for custody.	Not found.	Announcements only
Liqvid	Unclear. A testnet lending deployment appears in XOXNO/rs-lending-xlm.	Not found.	Unverified
Octarine	Not a lending market: RWA liquidity auctions and planned liquidation auctions for lending protocols (Blend, Aquarius, DeFindex). Settlement contract on testnet.	n/a	SCF project page
DeFindex	Vaults that route into strategies (e.g. Blend).	Vault-level, per strategy: pause_strategy, unpause_strategy and rescue, callable by the Emergency Manager or Manager role (check_role → require_auth).	Source: paltalabs/defindex @ a0fcabf apps/contracts/vault/src/lib.rs:431,497,527, access.rs

Implication: for Blend, the only immediate lever is pool-wide set_status. A guard that pauses one RWA reserve cannot act in under a week through Blend’s own controls. The realistic integration is: an RWA-only pool (or one RWA per pool) whose status admin is a narrowly scoped keeper.

8. Building blocks

attest.so. Soroban contracts (authority resolver + core attestation protocol) and a TypeScript SDK (@attest.so/sdk); schemas named like did:attest:identity (npm README). Unverified: contract interfaces and schema encoding. Assessment: an attest.so attestation could carry a signed reserve report, but Assay’s registry must compute status on-chain (min coverage across fresh attestors, staleness, supply mismatch), which needs the report fields in our own storage. Option for T1: accept reports posted directly, and optionally mirror or ingest attest.so attestations under an Assay schema.

OpenZeppelin Stellar smart accounts (policies, context rules, docs track the main branch, no version stated):

• Context rule types: Default, CallContract(Address), CreateContract(BytesN<32>). Scoping is per contract, not per function; nothing documented scopes a rule to one function name.
• Policy trait: enforce, install, uninstall (associated AccountParams); up to 5 policies per rule. Built-ins: simple threshold, weighted threshold, spending limit (a forum report says spending limit only meters transfers).
• Implication for the scoped keeper (T2-D1): a rule CallContract(blend_pool) would allow any call to the pool. Limiting the keeper to set_status needs a custom policy that checks the function name and arguments in enforce, or a wrapper contract like pool-status-admin that exposes only set_status. The wrapper is simpler and already exists.